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Abstract 
System Dynamics has the potential to study the aspects of complex systems including its likely effect of 
modifications to structural and dynamic system properties that cannot be achieved with traditional 
approaches. This paper presents a review of literature addressing safety issues using system dynamics across 
safety-critical domains. Forty studies were included and classified based on a customised human factors 
safety taxonomy framework. The thematic analysis of the literature resulted in five themes: external factors, 
organisational influences, unsafe supervisions, preconditions for unsafe acts and unsafe acts. The findings 
suggest that using system dynamics can be a potential tool in improving safety. This can be achieved through 
improved decision-making by basing it on system analysis, analysing past behavioural events in a modelling 
structure to plan effective safety policies, as well as looking at a holistic approach when analysing accidents. 
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1. Introduction 
Understanding the mechanism of complex systems is a daunting task. Several existing methods used for 
examining the causal nature of events are unable to account for the non-linear interactions and feedback in 
complex systems because they are based on a linear paradigm. Equipment or humans are wrongly held 
responsible for any mishap when accidents are described sequentially in a system. Thus, learning how to 
prevent the reoccurrence of accidents becomes very difficult as opportunities for understanding the system 
mechanism are not utilized (Underwood et al., 2016). Unfortunately, majority of the tools used within safety-
critical industries are based on these linear, sequential models of causality (e.g. Root Cause Analysis, Human 
Performance Enhancement System, and the Swiss Cheese Model). Nevertheless, there is an increasing 
awareness that the current tools are becoming ineffective due to the complex nature of the systems within 
which they are used (Marais et al., 2009; Svedung & Rasmussen, 2002; Leveson, 2004; Le Coze, 2005; 
Reiman and Oedewald, 2007; Rasmussen, 1997). Several accident models based on a System Safety paradigm 
have been developed to address these challenges since linear and sequential tools are only suitable for 
industries with loose coupling and linear interactions (Hollnagel, 2008). Some of the models that adopt this 
System Safety paradigm include AcciMap (Svedung and Rasmussen, 2002), Functional Resonance Accident 
Model (Hollnagel and Goteman, 2004) and the Systems Theoretic Accident Model and Process (STAMP) 
(Leveson, 2004). Although they have a limitation in predicting system responses to policy changes, these 
models have been shown to be effective in analysing accident occurrence in complex socio-technical systems 
(Nancy Leveson et al., 2003). Whilst some policy decisions appear not to have any effect on safety, they 
might drastically reduce safety in reality as well as increase risk.  
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Various aspects of complex systems such as the possible effect of changes in the dynamic and structural 
system properties cannot be understood using traditional approaches but can be studied with System 
Dynamics (SD). Organisations can be better prepared for accidental occurrences if they are able to analyse the 
causal structure and dynamics behind such events as well as learn from them, which makes it more easy to 
comprehend the warning signs (events and behaviours) for accidents and errors. These warning signs may 
appear as frequent patterns of behaviour or structure that precedes an event. Several authors such as 
Wolstenholme (2003) and Senge (1990) have identified these common patterns and behaviours or system 
archetypes in different contexts. 
SD is a computer-based simulation method primarily used for qualitative and quantitative analysis of 
complex problems that develop or persist over time. It has been widely used in modelling across a range of 
applications that range from socio-economic to engineering systems, but its potential has not yet been fully 
realised as a tool for understanding system safety and supporting important strategic decision-making. The 
objective of this paper is to examine the connection between safety improvement and SD by reviewing 
literature that attempts to improve system safety in complex systems by utilising SD modelling. In doing so, 
the following three questions are explored: what safety issues have been addressed by SD, how has SD been 
applied to improve system safety and how might SD be further applied to system safety? 
The rest of the paper is organised as follows: the second section will briefly look at the concept of system 
safety with a clear emphasis on the evolution of existing system safety tools and its present limitations. The 
third section will briefly explain what SD is. The fourth section will describe the safety framework used to 
compartmentalise and analyse the findings from the literature analysis and the approach to the literature 
review. Findings are presented in section five, and finally, we return to discuss our findings with respect to the 
three research questions. 
2. System Safety in Complex Socio-Technical Systems 
Earlier types of accident models (sequential and epidemiological) have viewed safety in a reactive way as 
opposed to a proactive manner by primarily focusing on retrospectively ‘learning from events’ instead on 
proactively assessing the safety (Hollnagel et al., 2007). This ‘learning from events’ strategy has obviously 
pointed out several faults in a large number of past accidents, which has further emphasised the need to 
address safety proactively as well as to focus on organisational processes that are involved in ‘safety 
management’. As a result, systemic models have been introduced in a bid to carry out a more detailed 
investigation on managerial and organisational failures in connection with the occurrence of accidents 
(Reason, 1990). There are two basic concepts used in existing literature on system safety, and these include 
the notion that safety is a ‘control problem and that a ‘system theoretic’ approach is required to address safety 
(Saleh et al., 2010). Safety is regarded as a control problem since accidents occur whenever the management 
control system cannot sufficiently handle component failures, external troubles and deteriorating interactions. 
Today, accident occurrence is still largely being attributed to human error. Incentives exist for 
organisations to blame operators to evade or avoid possible lawsuits and public outcry. According to Johnson 
(1980), an accident is more likely to be attributed to human error when less is known about the specific 
circumstances. Perrow (1999, 1984) said that “human error” is usually the only reasonable explanation given 
by organisations for accidents whose real cause is either complex or uncertain or plainly embarrassing. The 
truth is that accidents are not usually caused by humans because they are always governed by a set of rules 
and behaviour which determines how they interact within a social and physical context. Thus, it is easy for an 
organisation to detect any form of deviation with such rules and behaviour in place.  
Rasmussen and Svedung (2002, 2000) attributed the Zeebrugge ferry accident to those in charge for 
making decisions about scheduling and operation, vessel and harbour design as well as cargo and passenger 
management because they failed to understand the impact of their decisions on the system-level processes and 
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other decision makers. Rasmussen (1997) stated that most decisions are affected by budget pressures, time 
and short-term contextual incentives which affect behaviour, and they are only locally rational. Although 
these decisions may seem safe and reasonable within the individual work environment and local pressures, 
they may interact in unexpected ways to create accidents when considered in relation to the entire system 
operation (Dulac and Leveson, 2004). 
The actual cause of accidents in complex socio-technical systems is poor decision making, which is often 
due to poor safety culture or excessive performance pressure. As a result, unknown failure modes are usually 
not the cause of accidents in such systems. Thus, in order to carry out an effective risk analysis, a more 
inclusive approach is required which encompasses the managerial, technical, organisational, political and 
social aspects of the system and its environment. Complex systems often become unstable or unsafe when 
accidents occur in such systems, which may lead to catastrophes whenever there are small deviations 
(Leveson, 1995; Leveson, 2004; Rasmussen, 1997). Thus, it is important to keep risk at a sustainable level 
throughout the lifecycle of the system in order to avoid the occurrence of accidents. 
2.1. Systemic Accident Models 
The occurrence of accidents in complex socio-technical systems has been analysed using several systems 
techniques. Whilst individual-centred approaches were used in the late 1970s to find the causes of accidents; 
the systems approach to safety became popular in the 1980s as it was observed that disasters were primarily 
caused by managerial failures (Salmon et al.,  2010). Up to now, several risk analysis methods have emerged 
that dominate system safety literature such as the Risk Management Framework (Rasmussen, 1997), Human 
Factors Analysis and Classification System (Shappel and Wiegmann, 2000), Functional Resonance Analysis 
Method (Hollnagel and Goteman, 2004) and STAMP (Leveson, 2004). These non-linear methods have been 
very effective in investigating the complex interactions amongst systemic factors that may lead to accidents.  
 
• Risk Management Framework was introduced by Rasmussen wherein he developed multi-levels to 
explain the complexity of a socio-technical system involved in the control of safety. Rasmussen 
observed that the dynamic character of today's society dramatically changed the types of methods 
needed to understand structure and behaviour of socio-technical systems. Factors such as high degree 
of coupling of technologies, the volatility of economic and political climates and a fast-moving 
technological change each contribute to an environment in which pressures and constraints that 
define work practices are continuously shifting (Vicente and Christoffersen, 2006). Consequently, to 
fully appreciate why such systems fail or work, modelling tools are required that provide an 
integrated view of various factors that directly and indirectly input on complex socio-technical 
systems. Here, the complex socio-technical systems involved in risk management generally consist 
of five levels including government, regulators and associations, company, management, and staff 
and work.  
• HFACS was developed by Shappell and Wiegmann (2000) based on sound human error theory. It 
recognises all the holes in Reason’s (1990) famous Swiss cheese model. It includes the following 
four levels; unsafe acts, preconditions for unsafe acts, unsafe supervision and organisational 
influences. Each tier is broken down into yet lower sub-tiers. At the lowest level are the definitions 
utilised to categorise and classify the identified causal and contributing factors (Leplat and 
Rasmussen, 1984). It was primarily developed to investigate accidents/mishaps in the aviation sector; 
however, it has been adapted to a range of industrial domains, e.g. maritime and railway. 
• FRAM was introduced by Hollnagel to capture emergent phenomena in complex nonlinear systems 
(Hollnagel & Goteman, 2004). The concept behind this risk analysis method is that accidents occur 
in a system due to unforeseen resonances between the system and typical noise in its environment. 
Because this model focuses on system designs which are resistant to noise and disturbance, it is 
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suitable for accident prevention. In addition, an analysis is performed on the system to detect 
resonance modes which may be created through actions. Whilst this method does not take the linear-
event chain into consideration; it recognises the fact that safety is an emergent system property. 
Moreover, it places importance on the very real problem of the unexpected effects of disturbances on 
system operation. 
• STAMP was introduced by Leveson as a new causality model based on systems control theory. 
STAMP is not based on the premise of a chain of events, but rather is a constraint-based model that 
focuses on the important interactions between system components (Leveson, 2004, 2003). Whilst 
safety is considered to be a control problem; hazards are referred to as system states which lead to 
accidental events when merged with certain conditions in the system environment. Hierarchical 
control structures, which cover the whole socio-technical system, should be employed throughout the 
lifetime of the system in order to enforce constraints on the system states. In this hierarchical control 
structure, every level receives feedback from the level below it since all levels impose control on the 
levels below them. Military defence, aerospace, chemical, energy and transportation systems, as well 
as health, are some of the fields in which this structure has been used.  
 
All these approaches have limitations. The Risk Management Framework suffers from analysts’ hindsight 
leading to potential oversimplified causality, and counterfactual reasoning (Dekker, 2002) and its approach 
can only be used retrospectively. HFACS suffers from forceful 'fitting' of data into categories provided by the 
analyst which makes validation difficult (Salmon et al., 2005). FRAM does not provide the ability or 
instruction for how to discover resonance modes within the system or address system migration to high-risk 
operations (Stringfellow, 2010) and heavily relies on expert judgement in assessing system variability. 
Several authors have employed STAMP in conjunction with SD to investigate the causes of the control 
failures identified, however, it requires significant accurate data and becomes less useful when used for the 
analysis of smaller scale accidents as data required is often not readily available (Salmon, 2011). For SD to be 
used as a step in the STAMP process, several steps have to be implemented as a requisite. Furthermore, a 
STAMP analysis does not incorporate a timeline as the control structure diagram represents a 'snapshot' of the 
system's dynamic control relationships and organisational constraints (Johnson and Almeida, 2008). The 
aforementioned approaches may increase the system and risk understanding, but lack adequately supporting 
the decision-making on dynamic risk issues  (Bjerga et al.,  2016) and  SD has the potential to addresses these 
limitations.  
3. System Dynamics 
SD is an analytical modelling approach for studying complex feedback systems (Forrester, 1961). The 
approach has two key aspects, namely qualitative and quantitative.  The qualitative aspect, known as Causal-
Loop Diagram (CLD), is a diagramming approach that maps the causal relationships between pairs of 
elements within a system and recognises feedback loops revealing types of system behaviour. These loops can 
either be balancing (goal-seeking) or reinforcing (vicious) cycle and can demonstrate unintended 
consequences of their interactions as illustrated in Figure 1 (dispensing errors in a pharmacy setting).  
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Fig. 1. Causal Loop Diagram of dispensing errors: an increase in schedule pressure leads to higher dispensing errors, more rework (re-
dispense medications), increased amount of work to be done and back to even higher schedule pressure (reinforcing loop); an increase in 
schedule pressure, on the other hand, leads to increased productivity (faster work) decreased amount of work to be done and decreased 
schedule pressure (balancing loop) 
 
The quantitative aspect is based on a stock-and-flow diagram which models the relationships using 
differential equations. Inflows and outflows alter stocks (the state of the system) and generate information 
upon which decisions and actions are based on. Figure 2 illustrates an example of a stock-and-flow diagram 
based on Figure 1. 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
Fig. 2. Stock and Flow Diagram of dispensed prescriptions: an inflow is incoming prescriptions;  an outflow is dispensing rate; a stock is 
the accumulation of prescriptions that are ready to be dispensed. 
Decision makers are usually faced with the challenge of how to avoid using generalised notions about 
systems so as to utilise tools and processes that will enable them to have a better understanding of the 
complexity. This challenge can be addressed by using SD as it helps to enhance learning in complex systems 
(Leopold, 2016). However, learning about complex dynamic systems requires more than just creating 
mathematical models using technical tools. SD has a lot of advantages one of which includes providing a 
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strong and transparent model structure which promotes collaboration between stakeholders and SD modellers 
in the case of participatory or group modelling (Anderson & Johnson, 1997) 
Regarding safety, SD has the potential to provide stakeholders with the complex safety dynamics 
understanding of various contributing factors to errors and accidents and identify and test effective safety 
measures as described below. SD can address the limitations that other approaches have. The Risk 
Management Framework’s limitation of retrospective usage is addressed by SD as it can be applied both 
retrospectively to accident analysis and predictively to risk assessment. SD can address HFACS' limitation of 
forceful fitting of data into fixed categories by giving the modeller the unlimited restriction to accurately 
define categories. SD can address FRAM's reliance on expert judgement by presenting complex models in 
easy to understand visual context. STAMP’s limitation of requiring  data at the multiple levels can be 
addressed by SD’s qualitative aspect which provides insight into the problem's structure in a selected 
boundary without requiring much data at the whole system levels; successful quantified models in SD can be 
built based on the availability of limited data (Ortiz et al., 2008). Finally, the uncertainty modelling which 
cannot be addressed by the aforementioned approaches can be addressed by SD’s traditional process such as 
sensitivity analysis and testing and by means of qualitative mode of behaviour interpretations (Pruyt, 2014; 
Walker et al., 2014).  
In order to examine how has SD modelling approach been utilised to improve system safety in complex 
systems, the relevant literature was systematically searched, reviewed and analysed through the method 
described in the next chapter.  
4. Method 
     A systematic approach was employed to identify literature based on SD and safety. There were no time 
limits placed on the search, as there is no previous systematic review in this area and the scope of available 
literature was unknown. The accessed databases were PubMed, Web of Science, Science Direct and Google 
Scholar databases. The search words used were: system dynamics, causal loop diagrams, stock and flow, all in 
combination with safety, safety management, accident, errors. The keywords were used in Boolean 
combination, joined by AND. Papers eligible for inclusion were those that described applications of SD 
modelling to support safety. The literature was further supplemented by relevant publications in the reference 
lists of the publications collected. The title and abstract of each study were read, and the full-text article 
obtained if the researchers found that the study applied to the research question, based on previous literature. 
We used the most general definition of safety as being free from something undesired, unwanted or 
unacceptable (ISO/IEC, 2014)  although it carries a plethora of definitions. Empirical research articles, review 
articles, academic book chapters and conference papers addressing safety improvement using SD approach, 
were selected for the study. We have also included papers that significantly employed SD as part of hybrid 
approaches with some other methods. 
Both qualitative and quantitative SD approaches were included. The literature was analysed using thematic 
analysis (Braun and Clarke, 2006; Howitt and Cramer, 2008), which allows for the identification and 
exploration of major themes across the literature in a systematic, theoretically flexible manner. The initial 
stage of analysis involved becoming familiar with the literature by simply reading the articles. A total of 63 
articles were finally identified that applied SD modelling to safety. 
In order to examine what safety issues have been addressed by SD in the literature, the HFACS framework 
was chosen and used to identify and classify the SD applications. The HFACS framework comes equipped 
with its taxonomy to classify and analyses human error and accident causations. It has been validated through 
a number of studies across different industries such as military (Jennings, 2008; O’Connor et al., 2010; 
Shappell and Wiegmann, 2001), aviation (Reinach and Viale, 2006; Shappell and Wiegmann, 2001), rail 
(Baysari et al., 2008; Reinach and Viale, 2006), maritime shipping (Celik and Cebi, 2009), mining (Patterson 
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and Shappell, 2010), Petroleum/Gas (Aas, 2008), construction (Garrett and Teizer, 2009) and healthcare 
(ElBardissi et al., 2007). The original HFACS framework describes 19 causal categories within Reason's four 
levels of human failure (Shappell and Wiegmann, 2000), but it lacks a crucial tier that is equivalent to the 
government tier in Rasmussen’s (1997) six-levels of risk management framework. Whilst useful as originally 
designed for aviation, the four levels lacked an essential level to encompass a number of industries. This study 
introduced a new tier, therefore, changing the original HFACS framework into a modified HFACS framework 
which is entitled HFACS-EE (External Extension). As presented in Table 5, changes include adding a layer of 
Rasmussen’s hierarchical taxonomy to the existing HFACS with an addition of a new tier called External 
Factors. The additional tier allows us to categorise the SD safety applications in their respective safety 
category. The thematic content of each paper is classified according to its primary foci (highlighted in dark 
grey) and its secondary foci (highlighted in light grey). Primary foci are identified as the strong themes of the 
paper, whilst secondary foci are identified as visible, but not central themes in the papers. 
5. Results 
Figure 3 shows the number of relevant articles published in each year from 1984 till 2016. It shows that the 
application of SD to safety started in the academic field in the early 1980s. Since then, a stagnation of no 
contribution has characterised its trend until 2002 when the number of published articles using SD for safety 
research increased to around three articles per year. The reasons for the early gap can be explained by the re-
emergence of the sociotechnical approach based on complex non-linear models in the 1980s and beyond 
(Hettinger et al., 2015).  In 2000, SD was recognised and proven to be a potent method to gain valuable 
insights into events of dynamic complexity and policy resistance (Sterman, 2000). In 2015 and 2016, safety 
applications using SD increased dramatically, generating significant interest. 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
Fig. 3. Publication trend on SD application to system safety improvement (from 1984 till 2016) 
The next four tables (Table 1-4) summarise SD applications by sector, model type, study type and HFACS 
framework. Table 1 illustrates that the most applied sector is healthcare (25%), then construction (13%) 
followed equally (10%) by three sectors (disaster, aviation, and traffic).   
 
 
 
Table 1 SD applications to safety by sector 
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Sector Healthcare Construction Disaster Aviation Traffic Others 
Percentage 25% 13% 10% 10% 10% 32% 
 
Table 2 shows that the majority of the applications (78%) used stock flow diagrams, which investigate system 
behaviours through quantitative models based on real-world data. On the other hand, there were still 22% of 
the applications that used only causal loop diagrams (qualitative model).  
 
Table 2 SD applications to safety by model type 
Model type Quantitative model Both models Qualitative model 
Percentage 37% 41% 22% 
 
Table 3 shows that there are three main perspectives (i.e. theory development, problem-solving and case 
study) that altogether represent 90% of the identified papers. The remaining part is made up of 
methodological development. To contextually define the types of studies, a case study is an empirical inquiry 
using SD approach that investigates a contemporary phenomenon within its real-life context. Theory 
development is the application of SD approach for a given undertaken issue, analyse them technically with 
respect to current theory in order to gain carefully considered conclusions. Policy analysis and problem-
solving is the use of SD approach using inquiry and arguments to produce and transform policy-relevant 
information that may be utilised in organisational settings to resolve policy problems. Methodological 
development is the application of SD is the use of SD approach using inquiry and arguments to produce and 
transform policy-relevant information that may be utilised in organisational settings to resolve policy 
problems. Methodological development is the application of SD modelling approach in areas not utilised 
before, leading to a significant contribution the development of SD methodology. 
 
Table 3 SD applications to safety by study type   
Study type Case Study Policy analysis/   problem solving 
Theory 
development 
Methodological 
development 
Percentage 43% 33% 14% 10% 
 
Table 4 shows the categorisation results based on the extended HFACS taxonomy framework. Around 
46% of SD applications focused on issues at the level of organisational influences, in particular, covering the 
areas concerning resource management, organisational climate and operational process. The second most 
identified articles were geared towards issues at the work level (29%) whilst issues at management level were 
the third highest (11%). External factors were the second lowest (9%) which is relatively low given that 
exogenous factors influence safety all the time. Unsafe acts were the lowest (5%) revealing a gap in trend as 
SD   is mostly utilised for organisational interventions in order to improve the efficacy of enacted policies 
(Snabe, 2007). 
 
Table 4 SD applications to safety by HFACS framework 
Taxonomy Organisational influences 
Preconditions for 
Unsafe Acts 
Unsafe 
Supervisions 
External 
Factors 
 Unsafe Acts 
Percentage 46% 29% 11% 9% 5% 
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Table 5 presents the overall summary of the detailed HFACS framework-based categorisation of the sixty-
three articles identified. It shows what each article has addressed aspects of the safety (based on the extended 
HFACS framework).  More detailed analysis for each category are presented in the following sections (5.1 – 
5.4).  
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Table 5 SD applications to safety by the extended HFACS framework– see Appendix A for the detail descriptions of the framework 
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5.1. External factors 
Six SD applications have been identified and constructed that have the potential to impact safety policy 
from external factors (see Table 6). They include regulatory, social, political, environmental, and economic 
influences.  The first five papers in Table 6 look at external factors resulting from economic pressure, 
environmental concerns and legal pressure whilst the last paper looks at regulatory factors. A large portion of 
the cited applications (66%) applied conceptual modelling (Causal Loop diagrams) to investigate ways to 
improve public health and safety. 
Looking at the regulatory influences, a combination of STAMP and SD models was applied by Leveson et 
al. (2012) to improve pharmaceutical safety by enhancing the safety of current drugs as well as encouraging 
the development of new drugs. They combined several SD conceptual models to investigate the potential 
effectiveness and unintended side effects of FDA's post-approval safety policies. Authors identified additional 
safety controls that could be incorporated in the FDA legislation to improve public safety. Wang et al. (2013) 
address the rise in demand for PTSD services in military veterans by evaluating the screening and referral 
processes of the American Veterans Health Administration. Using a conceptual diagram, they include 
organisational factors and individual factors from pre-enlistment to post-discharge in their analysis of  PTSD  
prevention and treatment. Ellis (2004) developed an SD conceptual model of the Colombian civil war based 
on the interactions amongst criminal organisations, the guerrilla organisations, the economic base of the 
Colombian society and its government. From the model analysis, it was observed that the large number of 
"reinforcing feedback effects" in the system was capable of instigating violence and social chaos across the 
region, which could hamper the governments’ ability to react faster to narco-terrorism and other regional 
phenomena than traditional analysis.   
 
 
Table 6 1Literature Review – External Factors 
Researchers Year Type of study 
System 
Dynamics 
Tool 
Industry Purpose of SD Application 
Ellis  2004 Case study Causal Loop diagram 
Drug and 
Terrorism 
(Public safety) 
To present a systemic analysis of the geopolitical implication of 
narcoterrorism dynamics in Colombia and the Andean Ridge region and 
how this can affect public safety in the wider region. 
 
Tengs et al. 2004 Theory Development 
Stock-and-
Flow 
diagram 
Healthcare 
(Public Health 
Safety) 
To analyse gains or losses within public health from any change in the 
hazards or patterns of cigarette use 
 
Ahmad et al. 2007 Case Study 
Stock-and-
Flow 
diagram 
Healthcare 
(Public Health 
Safety) 
To compare the health benefits to society when various levels of tax 
increase are introduced as well as preventing youth access to cigarettes 
by increasing the legal purchase age to 21 
 
Leveson et 
al. 2012 Case study 
Causal Loop 
diagram 
Healthcare 
(Public Health 
Safety) 
To evaluate the efficacy of the safety policies when new pharmaceutical 
drugs are introduced. 
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Wang et al. 2013 Case study 
Causal Loop 
diagram 
Military & 
Healthcare 
(Patient Safety) 
To analyse the cost and benefit of the U.S. Military psychological health 
system on public safety  
Macmillan et 
al. 2016 Case study 
Causal Loop 
diagram  Traffic Safety 
To analyse media’s reports when it comes to cyclist mortality rate in 
London, concluding that increases in reporting driven by greater 
participation potentially give the impression that cycling has become 
more dangerous, and in turn may prevent further increases in 
participation. 
 
 
5.2. Organisational influences 
Twenty-nine SD applications have been identified and developed that have the potential to impact safety 
policy at the organisation level. They include organisational climate, resource management and operational 
process. 
 
5.2.1 Organisational climate  
Nineteen papers utilised SD applications that address the organisational climate which looks at the 
organisational culture, policies and structure (see Table 7). A vast majority of the papers utilised both a 
conceptual model and a simulation model to promote effective group learning.  This is shown in Cooke et al. 
(2006) who modelled the organisational memory of lessons learned from past accidents. In order to combat 
organisational complacency in safety and promote effective learning, the Perrow’s Normal Accident Theory 
(Perrow, 1984) and High-Reliability Theory (Rochlin, 2007) were combined by the researchers to model an 
organisational response system in which safety-related or past events were used as the basis for future 
planning. In their models, safety-related variables such as safety commitment, unsafe acts and production 
pressure were used to illustrate a bigger picture for future learning. Similarly, Xian et al. (2009) and Li et al. 
(2009) analysed fatal gas accidents in coal mines in China. Their simulation results revealed that time delay 
and feedback should be part of China’s coal mine safety organisational decision-making. Goh et al. (2012b) 
study revealed that risk perception could deteriorate when management had a strong production focus. Also, 
by using a group model building approach, Goh et al. (2012c) attempt to understand the reasons why even if 
the organisation had invested a mass of resources into safety, the injury rate could not be decreased.  McClure 
et al. (2015) developed an SD safety model that reveals the unintended consequences as well as opposing of 
health policies and interventions. By explicitly including both positive (increased active transport) and 
negative (increased transport injuries and fatalities) potential effects of land-use and transport policies, the 
authors were able to assess the overall benefits of different policies for population health. Guo et al. (2015) 
created an SD model and applied system archetypes to construction of safety management. They identified 
eight archetypes, ranging from “workers’ conflict goals” to “blame on workers” or “reactive and proactive 
learning”.  
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Table 7 2Literature Review – Organisational Climate 
Researchers Year Type of study System Dynamics Tool Industry Purpose of SD Application 
Rudolph and 
Repenning 2002 
Theory 
development 
Stock-and-Flow 
diagram 
Aviation 
Safety 
To highlights how catastrophic outcomes can be the result of an 
overaccumulation of mundane events and how the quantity of 
interruptions can push a system over its tipping point, rapidly 
degrading performance to the point that disaster is almost 
inevitable.  
Taylor and 
Dangerfield 2004 Case study 
Causal Loop 
and Stock-and-
Flow diagrams 
Healthcare 
(Patient 
Safety) 
To analyse why managerial interventions in cardiac 
catheterisation services in the UK fail.  
Cooke et al. 2006 Theory development 
Causal Loop 
and Stock-and-
Flow diagrams 
Disasters 
(Industrial 
Safety) 
To explore dynamics of the incident learning system, thereby 
motivating managers to introduce incident learning systems as a 
solution to move safety performance from normal accidents to 
high reliability. 
Tang 2007 Case study Stock-and-Flow diagram 
Government 
(Software 
System Safety) 
To analyse the risks and interrelationships of an e-government 
system. 
Ulrey and 
Shakarian 2008 Case study 
Stock-and-Flow 
diagram 
Aviation 
Safety 
To assess the impact of novel technology on safety and capacity 
of operations showing that reductions in either reporting 
interval length and/or control loop delay time resulted in 
increased safety and throughput levels. 
Topolšek and 
Lipičnik, 2009 
Policy analysis or 
problem-solving 
Causal Loop 
and Stock-and-
Flow diagrams 
Traffic Safety To reduce the number of motorway accidents due to wrong-way driving.  
Xian-gong et 
al. 2009 Case study 
Stock-and-Flow 
diagram 
Coal Mine 
Safety 
To analyse kinds of hazards and unsafe behaviour of employees 
in coal mine accidents in China from organisational and 
management perspective. 
Mohamed and 
Chinda 2011 
Theory 
development 
Causal Loop 
and Stock-and-
Flow diagrams 
Construction 
Safety 
To examine the relations amongst enables of construction safety 
culture and look at the potential effect of each enable on the 
organisational safety goals over a period of time. 
 
Goh et al. 2012a Methodological development 
Causal Loop 
diagram 
Coal Mine 
Safety 
 
To look at the dynamic relations between management of 
protection and production which has the potential effect to turn 
into an organisational accident. 
 
Goh et al. 2012b Case study Causal Loop diagram 
Coal Mine 
Safety 
To analyse accident prevention to assist in better understanding 
the causal influences of OHS performance. 
Bouloiz et al. 2013 Theory development 
Causal Loop 
and Stock-and-
Flow diagrams 
Multi-Industry 
(Industrial 
Safety) 
To assess the safety of a storage unit in Morocco by modelling 
various scenarios to improve the safety of the industrial system 
and implement managerial tools involving organisational, 
technical and human factors. 
Goh et al. 2013c Policy analysis or problem-solving 
Stock-and-Flow 
diagram Traffic Safety 
To provides a range of experimental scenarios that will help 
policy and decision-makers develop appropriate and suitable 
traffic safety policies. 
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5.2.2 Resource management 
Five papers implemented SD applications that look at resource management which encompasses the realm of 
organisational-level decision-making vis-à-vis the sharing and maintenance of organisational assets (see Table 
8).  Practically all the studies employed the quantitative aspect of the SD approach.  Anderson et al. (1994)’s 
application of the SD quantitative aspect proved to be useful in evaluating various treatment programs 
designed to prevent mother-to-infant transmission of the HIV. It provided stakeholders with the ability to 
examine the effects of screening, treatment, transmission and seroprevalence rates amongst pregnant women 
on the costs and safety benefits of various prevention programs. It demonstrated that regimens that prevent or 
reduce perinatal transmission of HIV cannot be implemented because of cost issues.  
 
Table 8 3Literature Review – Resource Management 
 
Orjuela et al. 2015 Case study 
Causal Loop 
and Stock-and-
Flow diagrams 
Multi-Industry 
(Industrial 
Safety) 
To study the dynamic behaviour between transport 
infrastructure and the food supply chain in the city of Bogota. 
 
 
McClure et al. 2015 Policy analysis or problem-solving 
Stock-and-Flow 
diagram 
Healthcare 
(Public Health 
Safety) 
 
To illustrate different relationships amongst land use, transport, 
population health, and economic development in order to 
contrast the effect of different baseline scenarios and use – 
transport policies, on the motor vehicle crash deaths and 
disability-adjusted life years lost. 
  
Guo et al. 2015 Theory development 
Causal Loop 
and Stock-and-
Flow diagrams 
Construction 
Safety 
To develop eight construction safety archetypes and apply it to 
construction of safety management. 
 
Wang et al. 2016 Case study 
Causal Loop 
and Stock-and-
Flow diagrams 
Construction 
Safety 
To explore the mechanism of risk migration that resulted from 
the relations between a contractor’s technical and organisational 
systems. 
 
Lu et al. 2016 Policy analysis/   problem solving 
Causal Loop 
and Stock-and-
Flow diagrams 
 Aviation 
Safety 
To reveal the organisational mechanism involving complex 
dynamic interactions of accident causal factors (technical, 
organisational and human) within the area of aviation 
engineering. 
 
Goh and 
Askar Ali 
2016 Methodological development 
Causal Loop 
diagram 
Construction 
Safety 
To simplify integration of safety management considerations 
into construction activity simulation. 
 
Garbolino et 
al. 
2016 Case Study 
Causal Loop 
and Stock-and-
Flow diagrams 
Multi-Industry 
(Industrial 
Safety) 
To propose a dynamic risk analysis and scenarios analysis 
method using both SD and risk analysis. 
Researchers Year Type of study System Dynamics Tool Industry Purpose of SD Application 
Anderson and 
Anderson 1994 Case study 
Stock-and-Flow 
diagram 
Healthcare 
(Patient Safety) 
To evaluate death prevention methods of HIV-infected infants 
who die within seven years by screening and introducing 
treatment options for HIV-positive mothers and their newborns. 
 
Xiao-yan and 
Jian-hua 2010 Case study 
Stock-and-Flow 
diagram 
Healthcare 
(Patient Safety) 
To model a hospital emergency service supply chain by 
highlighting the risk of illness' aggravation patients face with no 
timely treatment.  
 
 
Maryani et al. 
2015 
Policy analysis 
or problem-
solving 
Causal Loop and 
Stock-and-Flow 
diagrams 
Construction 
Safety 
To analyse occupational accidents in construction projects and 
suggest improvements in the supply chain to enhance the 
quality of workers. 
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5.2.3 Organisational process 
Five papers looked at the organisational process which affects the organisational decisions and rules that 
govern the everyday activities within the organisation (see Table 9). One paper applied the qualitative SD 
approach only, and the other four papers applied the quantitative SD approach or both. In the first two papers, 
the SD proved to be useful for healthcare professionals to make decisions on health care priorities based on 
system analysis. Lane et al. (2000) developed an SD quantitative model that shows the relation between long 
waiting times in A&E and bed closures. The key finding of this model is that the major impact of bed 
shortages is not on emergency admissions, but was felt first on elective admissions so that using A&E waiting 
times to measure the effect of bed shortages is misleading. Gonzalez et al. (2016) discussed how a set of 
vicious feedback loops caused by following standard organisational procedures that do not fit the disaster 
situation, initially increases errors in response. Eventually, learning and sense-making in an 
improvisation/experimentation process lead to new emergent dynamics whereby the loops act virtuously. 
Lane at al. (2000) and Gonzalez et al. (2016) findings stress that more emphasis needs to be placed on system 
analysis and understanding the behavioural structure of key elements within the system that might not seem 
related at first glance. 
 
Table 9 4Literature Review – Organisational Process 
 
 
Chia et al. 2015 
Policy analysis 
or problem-
solving 
Stock-and-Flow 
diagram 
Nuclear Safety 
To examine the complex factors surrounding nuclear energy 
development in Singapore by evaluating four critical aspects, 
namely political, social, economic and environmental aspects in 
various scenarios. 
 
Turner et al. 2016 Case study 
Causal Loop and 
Stock-and-Flow 
diagrams 
Disaster 
(Flood Safety) 
To explore the potential trade-offs between 
the use of existing and new infrastructure; water 
and food risk security and the accompanying cost implications. 
Researchers Year Type of study System Dynamics Tool Industry Purpose of SD Application 
Lane et al. 2000 Policy analysis or problem-solving 
Causal Loop and 
Stock-and-Flow 
diagrams 
Healthcare 
(Patient 
Safety) 
To showcase the interaction of demand pattern, A&E resource 
deployment, and other hospital processes and bed numbers, 
allowing decision makers to base their decisions on systemic 
analysis to improve healthcare quality and safety. 
Lattimer et 
al. 2004 Case study 
Causal Loop and 
Stock-and-Flow 
diagrams 
Healthcare 
(Patient 
Safety) 
To investigate the scenarios for changing in terms of patient 
flows and bottlenecks and ways to intervene to ameliorate the 
worst-case scenarios. 
Mohaghegh 
et al. 2009 
Methodological 
development 
Stock-and-Flow 
diagram 
Aviation 
Safety 
To investigate safety within the aviation by looking at the error 
probability of technicians over a period of 15 years as well as 
predicting management’s commitment to safety. 
 
 
 
Du and 
Zhang 
2015 Policy analysis or problem-solving 
Causal Loop and 
Stock-and-Flow 
diagrams 
Aviation 
Safety 
To demonstrate the interactions between flight safety and safety 
investment so that the optimal safety investment program can be 
determined in order improve level of flight safety. 
 
 
 
Gonzalez et 
al. 
2016 Policy analysis or problem-solving 
Causal Loop 
diagram 
Disaster 
(Landslide 
Safety) 
 
To present large-scale disaster response of dissimilar types and 
what type of controls, such as training and policies, are available 
to reduce the vicious loops and speed the transition from errors 
to successful innovation 
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5.3. Unsafe Supervisions 
Seven articles identified have applied SD approach to the safety policy at the management level. 
 
5.3.1 Inadequate supervision  
Five papers employed SD methodology that looks at inadequate supervisions in safety (see Table 10). One 
paper applied the qualitative SD approach only, and the other four papers applied the quantitative approach or 
both. A significant portion of the papers used case studies involving major accidents and examined how the 
SD approach can provide additional insight into the causes of these accidents. Salge et al. (2006) developed 
two separate SD models to illustrate that the Chernobyl accident was caused by a combination of human 
failure in the design of the reactor and poor decision-making. They argued that people could be blamed for 
those who design risk generating structures and those who react to failures in ways that increase the problem. 
They concluded that individuals who are aware of high-risk situations and wish to repair them would quite 
often behave in ways that will worsen the situation. Cooke (2003) examines the condition that led to the fatal 
explosion at the Westray mine in Canada using the SD approach. By providing valuable insights into the 
behaviour of the Westray mine disaster, Cooke argues that commitment to safety cannot be affected by 
production pressure. Consequently, he concludes that reduction in management commitment to safety can 
trigger a vicious cycle of frequent incidents, increase in production losses and pressure, and a further decrease 
in management commitment to safety.  
Minami & Madnick (2009) used an SD approach to look beyond the human error in combat vehicle 
accidents and studied the organisational problems that were regarded as the real causes. They argued that with 
the short period efforts aiming to impose safety behaviours of combat soldiers will, in the long run, boost 
tiredness, fatigue and complacency. This, in turn, would destroy the primary safety policy and consequently 
recommended that understanding the dynamic effect various delays would yield has the greatest potential for 
improving safety.  
 
Table 10 5Literature Review – Inadequate Supervision 
Researchers Year Type of study System Dynamics Tool Industry Purpose of SD Application 
Cooke 2003 Case study 
Causal Loop and 
Stock-and-Flow 
diagrams 
Coal Mine 
Safety 
To examine the contributing factors of the Westray mine 
disaster, including interactions that could have led to the 
conditions that triggered the fatal explosion at the mine. 
Simonovic and 
Ahmad 2005 Case study 
Causal Loop and 
Stock-and-Flow 
diagrams 
Disaster 
(Flood 
Safety) 
To assess the effectiveness of different flood evacuation 
policies thereby contributing to a higher quality of decisions 
and a higher level of emergency preparedness. 
Salge and 
Milling 2006 Case study 
Causal Loop and 
Stock-and-Flow 
diagrams 
Nuclear 
Safety 
To analyse the accident at the Chernobyl power plant by 
looking at the human failures in two stages: planning and 
design of the socio-technical-environment and online 
operations. 
Minami & 
Madnick 2009 Case study 
Causal Loop 
diagram 
Military 
Safety 
To study the upper-level organisational processes and 
complications that constitute the root causes of accidents 
instead of focusing on symptoms and events of accidents which 
normally specify human error. 
 
Wu and Xie 2012 Theory development 
Stock-and-Flow 
diagram 
Railway 
Safety 
To enhance emergency safety decision-making efficiency in 
railway management. 
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5.3.2 Planned inappropriate operations 
Two papers looked at planned inappropriate operations of which supervision fails to adequately assess the 
hazards (see Table 11). Both papers developed qualitative models and converted it to quantitative simulation 
models in order to understand the factors affecting delay within the system. Min et al. (2011) assessed the 
behaviour of disaster-relief supply chain under adverse conditions. Akkermans and Van Oorschot (2016) 
modelled a major new aircraft development based on inputs from the industry. The results suggested that 
major improvements occur when more concurrency is allowed because, in projects of such complexity, 
concurrent team learning is crucial. 
 
Table 11 6Literature Review – Planned Inappropriate Operations 
 
5.4. Preconditions for Unsafe Acts 
Eighteen SD applications have been identified that utilised the SD approach to look at safety in the work 
environment. These include environmental factors, the condition of the operator and personnel factors. 
 
5.4.1 Physical and technical environment factors 
Seven papers applied SD simulation to look at the physical and technical environmental factors (see Table 
12). Majority of the papers addressed issues concerning road traffic safety as well as nuclear safety. Chong et 
al. (2015) investigated the trade-offs of various quality and safety outcomes in an emergency department to 
assess the efficiency of healthcare systems. Similiarly, Rong et al. (2016) modelled the interrelationships 
amongst the factors in missile operations which may contribute to accidents. The long-term behaviour of a 
socio-technical system with several human operations under the given conditions is clearly reflected in this 
temporal uncertainty analysis, which enables people to examine the possible trade-offs between short-term 
profits and sustainable long-term improvement. Woo (2015) was able to characterise power uprates in nuclear 
power plants and found that the cost of nuclear power plants can be minimised through risk assessment which 
can also help to avert unexpected disasters and increase their safety level. 
 
 
Table 12 7Literature Review – Physical and Technical Environment Factors 
Researchers Year Type of study System Dynamics 
Tool 
Industry 
Purpose of SD Application 
Mehmood et 
al. 2003 
Policy analysis or 
problem-solving 
Stock-and-Flow 
diagram 
Traffic 
Safety 
To addresses the shortcomings of previous car-following models 
and how that contributes to traffic safety. 
Zhang et al. 2008 Case study Stock-and-Flow Traffic To elevate safety level of traffic accident scene and which factors 
Researchers Year Type of study System Dynamics Tool Industry Purpose of SD Application 
Min and Hong 2011 Case study 
Causal Loop and 
Stock-and-Flow 
diagrams 
Disaster 
Relief 
Safety 
To analyse impacts of delay to the disaster-relief system by 
studying several scenarios to improve decision-making.  
Akkermans and 
Van Oorschot 2016 
Policy analysis or 
problem-solving 
Causal Loop and 
Stock-and-Flow 
diagrams 
Aviation 
Safety 
To illustrate that less concurrency can contribute to overall 
project delays, rather than preventing them. 
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diagram Safety predominately influence it.  
Woo 2015 Policy analysis or problem-solving 
Causal Loop and 
Stock-and-Flow 
diagrams 
Nuclear 
Safety 
To analyse the economic and safety properties of power increases 
in nuclear power plants 
Chong et al. 2015 Case study 
Causal Loop and 
Stock-and-Flow 
diagrams 
Healthcare 
(Patient 
Safety) 
To study the trade-offs of various quality and safety results in an 
emergency department in order to assess the efficiency of 
healthcare systems. 
. 
Rong et al. 2016 Case study 
Causal Loop and 
Stock-and-Flow 
diagrams 
Nuclear 
Safety 
To analyse the Minuteman III missile accident in 2008 that looks 
at the interrelationships amongst technical and organisational 
aspects. 
Koh et al. 2016 Policy analysis or problem-solving 
Stock-and-Flow 
diagram 
 Traffic 
Safety 
To model human driving characteristics and driving patterns and 
simulate various types of driver behaviours 
Yan et al. 2016 Case study 
Causal Loop and 
Stock-and-Flow 
diagrams 
Railway 
Safety 
To analyse the typical cases of subway fires over past 20 years, 
highlighting the causes of the fire accidents and extracting 
influencing factors such as equipment, human, environment and 
emergency management. 
 
5.4.2 Condition of operators 
Nine papers employed SD methodology to address the conditions of individuals that can have the adverse 
influence on their job performance (see Table 13). Majority of the papers addressed safety issues within the 
healthcare. Homer (1984) applied the qualitative SD to explore the dynamics of "worker burnout" and 
demonstrate the potential effectiveness of stabilising techniques that can diminish work-related stress or 
enhance relaxation which in turn increases overall productivity. The author showed that the individual can 
effectively manage the self-inflicted nature of burnout. Similarly, Oliva (2001) modelled responses to work-
related pressure in service industries and simulated the impacts of increased level of working, cutting corners, 
lowering standards and expectations which delay the resourcing of additionally required capacity. He 
illustrated how this is particularly challenging in healthcare, where high professionalism and lengthy training 
times make the situation considerably worse in comparison to other industries. McDonnell (2005) modelled 
interactions amongst the key determinants of medication errors, in particular, the complex interactions of 
patients and staff, information, medications, work practices and the infrastructure and policies within a 
hospital environment. Rashwan and Arisha (2015) examined a clinical unit in a large hospital in Ireland in 
order to simulate the impact of nurses' behaviours at their burnout level on unit performance measures. 
Working with the nurses and the management team of the unit, the authors developed an SD model to 
encompass the factors that may contribute to the burnout phenomenon and also the relationship between these 
factors and the performance measures.  
 
 
 
Table 13 8Literature Review – Condition of Operators 
Researchers Year Type of study System Dynamics 
Tool 
Industry 
Purpose of SD Application 
Homer 1984 Policy analysis or problem-solving 
Causal Loop 
diagram 
Healthcare 
(Patient Safety) To explore the dynamics of worker burnout. 
Oliva 2001 
Policy analysis or 
problem-solving 
Stock-and-Flow 
diagram 
Multi-Industry 
(Industrial 
Safety) 
To highlight the trade-offs in responses to work pressure in 
the service industry and how that affects stress and 
burnout. 
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McDonnell 2005 Policy analysis or problem-solving 
Stock-and-Flow 
diagram 
Healthcare 
(Patient Safety) 
To represents the interactions amongst the key 
determinants such as everyday clinical work amongst 
patients and staff that deliver medications safely. 
Morris et al. 2010 Theory development Causal Loop diagram 
Healthcare 
(Patient Safety) 
To measure vague human factors variables such as stress 
in a way that is understandable, computable, robust and 
capable of being validated. 
 
Guo et al. 2013 Methodological development 
Causal Loop 
diagram 
Healthcare 
(Patient Safety) 
To identify the relationship between schedule and quality 
performances and the components related to a safety 
program and how that impacts safety management in 
practice.  
Han et al. 2014 Case study Causal Loop 
diagram 
Construction 
Safety 
To look at the causation of unsafe behaviours in 
Construction.  
Shin et al. 2014 Theory development Stock-and-Flow diagram 
 Construction 
Safety 
To quantify fuzzy human factors variables such as stress in 
a way that is robust, computable, understandable, and 
capable of being validated.  
Rashwan and 
Arisha 2015 
Policy analysis or 
problem-solving 
Stock-and-Flow 
diagram 
Healthcare 
(Patient Safety) 
To identify factors affecting nurses' behaviour when they 
experience burnout level and its impact on patients’ 
experience time. 
Da 2016 Policy analysis/   problem solving 
Causal Loop and 
Stock-and-Flow 
diagrams 
Railway Safety To examine the influence of railway workers' mental processes and on safety attitudes and safe behaviour. 
 
 
5.4.3. Personal factors 
Two papers developed SD models that addressed the personal factors within the work environment (see 
Table 14). Wei et al. (2012) modelled the problems of human errors in the aircraft cockpit and discovered that 
a systems modelling approach can make mid or long-term prediction of the prevention level of human errors 
in civil aviation incidents. Carhart (2010; 2009) adopted SD group model building using Causal Loop 
Diagrams (CLDs) as a tool for event investigation in the nuclear industry and demonstrated that CLDs can 
provide additional insights into the development of an event. Both papers showed the potential of the SD 
approach for proactively predicting system behaviour/failure. 
 
 
Table 14 9Literature Review – Personal Factors 
Researchers Year Type of study System Dynamics 
Tool 
Industry 
Purpose of SD Application 
Carhart 2009 Methodological development 
Causal Loop and 
Stock-and-Flow 
diagrams 
 Nuclear 
Safety 
To promote systems-thinking methodology in analysing 
incident causality and the investigation process for proactive 
hazard analysis programme. 
Wei et al. 2012 Methodological development 
Stock-and-Flow 
diagram 
Aviation 
Safety 
To simulate human error analysis of human cockpit errors and 
how it can be reduced.  
 
5.5. Unsafe Acts 
Three SD applications have been identified that look at the unsafe acts (operator level) including decision, 
skill-based and perceptual human errors and violations (see Table 15). Jiang et al. (2015) and Nakumura et 
al. (2015) constructed quantitative simulation models that look at unsafe behaviours of marine engineers and 
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construction workers respectively. Jiang et al. (2015) built upon Shin’s (2014) previous work by introducing 
an SD model for the causation of unsafe behaviours based on a holistic cognitive analysis of why unsafe 
behaviours happen. Through the simulation results, they reveal how construction workers can be better 
understood and how unsafe behaviours can be fundamentally prevented. Similarly, Nakumura et al. (2015) 
constructed a quantitative simulation model to comprehend how the behaviour pattern of engineers can 
contribute to marine accidents. 
  
Table 15 Literature Review –Unsafe Acts 
Researchers Year Type of study 
System 
Dynamics 
Tool 
Industry Purpose of SD Application 
Kontogiannis 2011 Policy analysis or problem-solving 
Causal Loop 
diagram 
Healthcare 
(Patient 
Safety) 
To analyse and compare error recovery strategies regarding patterns of 
system affordances, interaction, and types of recovery plans, allowing 
safety experts to produce resilient system designs and training 
solutions for managing human errors in unforeseen situations. 
 
Jiang et al. 2015 Policy analysis or problem-solving 
Stock-and-
Flow 
diagram 
Construction 
Safety 
To develop construction workers' mental process that can help analyse 
the feedback mechanisms and the resultant dynamics vis-à-vis the 
workers' safety attitudes and safe behaviours. 
 
Nakamura et 
al. 2015 
Policy analysis or 
problem-solving 
Stock-and-
Flow 
diagram 
 Maritime 
Safety 
To investigate characteristics of human errors in marine accidents by 
analysing latent factors and onshore management personnel  
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6. Discussion 
This paper aims to examine the connection between safety improvement and SD by reviewing literature 
that attempts to improve system safety in complex systems by utilising SD modelling. Based on the adopted 
safety framework, the extended HFACS, findings from the literature review were analysed and presented 
across five categories. We return here to discuss our findings with respect to the three research questions 
posed in section 1: what safety issues have been addressed by SD, how has SD been applied to improve 
system safety and how might SD be further applied to system safety? 
 
 6.1 What safety issues have been addressed by SD? 
 
SD was applied to address most of issues in the extended HFACS framework. The most interesting finding 
is that organisational influences, more specifically speaking, organisational climate, was the most dominant 
issue to which SD was applied. It proves that SD is instrumental in analysing complex socio-technical issues 
in the working environment within the organisation which includes culture, policies and structure.  Not 
surprisingly, organisational climate is linked with safety climate, so SD can be further utilised as a tool for 
studying dynamic interaction between safety climate/culture and various aspects in the subsequent tiers 
(supervision quality, working conditions and acts). The second most frequent use of SD was to address unsafe 
supervision, concentrating on the issue of inadequate supervision. It is defined as a factor in a mishap when 
supervision has failed to identify a hazard, recognise and control risk, provide guidance, training and/or 
oversight, and results in human error or an unsafe situation (Force, 2005). Much of the literature argues that 
lack of a solid communication between the workers and management causes management to forgo safety in 
order to promote production pressure, making way for potential unsafe acts to occur which are ultimately 
blamed on the sharp end. Much of the identified studies looked at the conditions of the operators as well as 
decision-based, skill-based and perception-based errors that they generate. The themes that keep repeating are 
solutions on how to reduce human errors by modelling high workload and fatigue and its interactions with the 
rest of the tiers. Only one SD application (2005) has encompassed over four tiers (Organisational influences, 
Unsafe supervisions, Preconditions for unsafe acts and Unsafe acts), revealing a glaring gap and future 
potential to develop further SD applications that cross across multiple tiers.SD has been utilised for both 
retrospective analysis (accident analysis) and prospective analysis (policy analysis). Approximately half of the 
studies were accident case studies where SD was utilised for accident investigation. Cooke (2003) for instance 
utilised SD to describe lessons learned from the Westray mining accident of 1992 in which a number of 
miners lost their lives. His SD model provided a useful means for identifying underlying causes with dynamic 
considerations. Nearly a quarter of the studies were SD applications that provide problem-solving or policy 
analysis. Topolšek et al. (2009) investigated why there was an increased number of traffic accidents based on 
wrong-way driving and highlighted intervention strategies and countermeasures to reduce it. The third most 
frequent type of study was theory development. One standard usage is reflected in Shin et al. (2014)’s paper 
where they used SD to capture construction workers' mental process to analyse the feedback mechanism and 
the resultant dynamics regarding the workers' safety attitudes and safety behaviours. The least common type 
of study was methodological development. Practically all the literature for methodological development were 
published nine years, perhaps an indication that there is a new drive to utilise SD to improve and address 
issues in system safety. An example of methodological development is Goh et al. (2012b) who focused on 
modelling and providing analysis between management of production and production whilst addressing an 
existing gap. Consequently, SD modelling seems to be more applicable when developed for accident case 
studies and problem-solving/policy analysis as the literature shows.  
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6.2 How has SD been applied to improve system safety? 
 
The second question explores how SD has been applied to improve system safety. Based on the existing 
literature, SD has been successfully applied to address several safety issues in many different ways: i) 
proactively preventing incidents; ii) group learning; iii) testing out potential policy impacts on safety. Mental 
models of the factors that promote accidents were created by Cooke et al. (2006) who also tested the viability 
of potential methods for their prevention. Similarly, employing the SD approach, Shin et al. (2014) modelled 
the mental process factors behind the unsafe activities of construction workers. Several interventions for 
promoting safe behaviours and improving safety-related communications were evaluated by the authors who 
also demonstrated the suitability of this model as an expressive tool (i.e. a shared mental model). In a different 
light, the issue of misuse of personal protective equipment (PPE) among pesticide applicators was 
investigated by Feola et al. (2012) who examined how different inventions could be applied to minimise this 
problem of PPE mismanagement. SD has been utilised as an effective strategy for enhanced learning where 
one application introduced an organisational response system in which precursor events, or safety-related 
incidents, are used as the basis for training and planning to combat organisational complacency and promote 
effective learning  For policy impacts on safety, Leveson (2012) devised a model that shows the efficacy of 
the safety policies when new pharmaceutical drugs are introduced. 
Not surprisingly, over a third of the identified SD applications are used in healthcare domain, and this is 
consistent with the increasing usage of SD in healthcare in contrast to other industries over the past decade 
(Brailsford, 2008). Homer et al. (2006) argue that SD modelling is the perfect candidate to address the 
dynamic complexity that characterises many public health issues. 
 
6.3 How might SD be further applied to system safety? 
 
The third question explores how SD might be further applied to system safety. The implementation of SD 
implies capturing the complexity of social reality by developing models based on the mentality of the 
different individuals involved in a system, so as to interpret or define a phenomenon or problem (Lane and 
Oliva, 1998). It allows critical issues to be explored from different perspectives, which enables the modeller 
to have access to insights and changes relating to alternative techniques as well as to compare the outcomes of 
various scenarios generated from simulation (Lane and Oliva, 1998). 
The results of both theoretical and practical implementations suggest that SD has the potential to improve 
safety in a variety of sectors but is underused. It could produce deep learning with a dynamic and contextual 
appreciation not provided by the current models and tools. Moreover, there seems to be a lack of applied 
system dynamic models in safety-critical industries where trade-offs are used all the time. SD has the 
potential to provide a balancing and strategic learning output in determining the most optimal trade-off. With 
increasingly complex systems being built, useful tools are needed that allow us to understand their 
complexity, design better safety policies and guide effective change. SD has the potential to provide and 
implement enhanced learning for safety, and it continues to be a contender as a sophisticated management 
decision support tool for complex systems. Decision makers can benefit from virtual scenario testing within a 
safe simulation environment so that impacts on policy adjustments can be immediately visualised.  
A number of studies (Goh et al., 2012a; Han et al., 2014; Lattimer et al., 2004; Taylor and Dangerfield, 
2004) argue that the SD approach has the potential to be applicable in related areas with slight modifications.  
Some others mentioned that fine-tuning is necessary based on continuous feedback from stakeholders 
(Simonovic and Ahmad, 2005). Others have argued that given limited time and resources, the qualitative 
aspect of SD can be a potential tool to elicit insights and enable learning (Carhart, 2009). Goh et al. (2012b) 
argue that SD modelling should not be considered as a complete replacement or substitute for existing 
approaches but should be utilised as part of a complementary tool. This is similarly echoed by Wang et al. 
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(2013) and Jiang et al. (2015) who argue that since SD studies high-level effects at an aggregate level, 
individual differences and data outliers are lost. As a result, having supplementary modelling approaches is 
beneficial to understand system complexity. 
In comparison with the existing accident risk analysis models such as Rasmussen’s Risk Management 
Framework, STAMP, FRAM, and HFACS, SD has the potential to cover the limitations accompanying those 
frameworks as it can enhance our understanding of the dynamic behaviour of systems in both qualitative and 
quantitative aspects. The existing frameworks tend to be qualitative and static in nature, but safety is never a 
static quality that can be achieved because systems are always moving to states of high risk (Dulac, 2007).  
SD enables the behaviour of the system (and its subsystems) to be both represented and simulated. Its 
simulation capability allows changes such as technical or organisational safety means to be tested to evaluate 
their potential effectiveness prior to implementation. Changes can be introduced in either the design or the 
operation phase. As a result, it can form part of a continuous improvement strategy for the prevention and 
management of safety issues.  
The SD framework incorporates delay which can be used to understand the dynamic effect of various time 
delays in the system. Understanding and using delays can be significant for implementing effective long-term 
safety measures in lieu of short-term actions.  Delays also help understand the impact of unintended side-
effects arising from short-term safety measures and also a result, efforts can be made to mitigate its impacts 
(Minami et al., 2010; Xian-gong et al., 2009). 
The SD tool can also be used to generate insights through behavioural archetypes which can visualise 
complex phenomena. Causal loop diagrams can be used to identify emerging problems proactively rather than 
having to resort to event-level interventions (Goh et al., 2010). When the systemic structure is better 
understood, intervention points to improve and sustain safety culture can be identified (Goh et al., 2010). As 
has been previously demonstrated (Senge, 1990) causal loop diagrams can be sufficient for communicating 
behavioural archetypes to improve safety.  
Unlike existing safety frameworks, SD provides a unique process of participation and model building that 
gives an insight into the causes of accidents. The participants can be better understood through active 
investigation and retrospective learning. A safety culture is usually developed through constant learning and 
examination of these events in various industries. Safety also deals with the ability of a system, especially 
complex socio-technical systems prone to high impact and low probability events, to react to new and unique 
developments as well as to keep track of existing processes. A lot of investigations have been carried out on 
the importance and nature of learning in safety-critical domains. Learning within the organisations was 
identified by several authors to be disjointed and basically focused on the local process whilst neglecting the 
deep learning stage of the underlying processes (Carroll et al., 2002; Huber et al., 2009). It is believed that this 
deep learning can be obtained from systems models. It is not enough to rehearse emergency plans and ensure 
they have been learnt (Lagadec, 1997). Effective deep learning is needed in order to prepare for these unique 
developments, and this deep learning is provided by the participatory model building of causal loop diagrams 
and SD models for prospective and external events as well as internal investigations. 
It is important to point out that not all potential consequences of a decision can be conveyed by the SD 
framework. In addition, it is not capable accurately and wholly predicting the nature and effect of all factors 
endogenous to the system. However, it provides the option to conduct numerous, iterative test-runs of the 
safety performance of a system in operationally relevant scenarios. This gives stakeholders the access to 
relevant information pertaining the probabilities of various adverse consequences as well as possible means of 
eliminating unanticipated and unintended consequences. 
In short, the application of SD as a system safety enhancement technique will enable researchers and 
decision makers to understand how changes in the structural and dynamic properties of a system can influence 
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its current and future behaviours. This allows them to identify safety improvements as well as adverse 
consequences. 
7. Conclusion and Future Challenges 
This paper aims to examine the connection between safety and SD by reviewing literature that attempted to 
improve system safety in complex systems by utilising SD modelling. A literature search and thematic 
analysis of empirical literature addressing SD application in safety-critical domains was conducted. The 
findings were categorised based on a modified safety framework that we entitled HFACS-EE. 
Simulation has mainly been used in system safety as an instrument for predicting system behaviour, testing 
model structures, testing different techniques as well as analysing various scenarios as revealed by the 
literature reviewed in this research. In view of the results obtained, the authors were able to improve safety 
through greater decision-making by including past behavioural events in modelling structures to create 
effective safety policies, performing system analysis as well as applying a holistic approach to analyse the 
causes of accidents beyond human error. In circumstances where the actions, omissions, communications or 
policies of top management directly or indirectly affect supervisory practices, actions or conditions of the 
operator(s) and lead to human error, stem failure or an unsafe situation, SD has often been used as a tool to 
pinpoint the factors responsible for accidents.   
The future adoption of the SD approach in the field of system safety basically depends on various factors 
such as creating more awareness about the feasibility of the SD methodology and applying it in practical 
safety scenarios 
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Appendix A. HFACS 
A.1. Brief description of HFACS-EE causal categories  
External Factors 
Regulatory Factors The effects that government adopted laws, regulations and policies have on 
the organisation. It includes how actions of the regulator, including 
inspections and enforcement, affect safety. The formulation to control over 
hazardous processes. 
Others The effect society as a whole has on the safety including economic pressure, 
environmental concerns and legal pressure 
O
rganisational Influences 
Organisational 
climate 
The working atmosphere within the organisation which includes culture, 
policies and structure 
Operational 
process 
This refers to organisational decisions and rules that govern the everyday 
activities within the organisation. This includes the establishment/use of 
standard operational procedures, and formal methods for maintaining 
oversight of the workforce. 
Resource 
management 
This encompassess organisational-level decision-making vis-à-vis the sharing 
and maintenance of organisational assets (such as personnel, money, 
equipment and facilities) 
U
nsafe supervisions 
Inadequate 
supervision 
The factors that supervision fails to identify a hazard, recognise and control 
risk, provide guidance, training and/or oversight, etc., resulting in human 
error or an unsafe situation 
Planned 
inappropriate 
operations 
The factors that supervision fails to adequately assess the hazards associated 
with an operation and allow for unnecessary risks 
Failed to correct 
problems 
The factors that supervision fails to correct known deficiencies in documents, 
processes or procedures, or fails to correct inappropriate or unsafe actions of 
individuals create an unsafe situation 
Preconditions for unsafe acts 
Environmental 
factors 
This category encompasses a variety issues, including the design of 
equipment and controls, display/interface characteristics, checklist layout, 
task factors and automation. It also includes the operational setting (e.g. 
weather, altitude, terrain) and the ambient environment (e.g., heat, vibration, 
lighting, toxins) 
Condition of the 
operator 
The conditions of an individual that can have adverse influence to perform 
his/her job such as mental fatigue resulting from high work-load, pernicious 
attitudes, and misplaced motivation. This also includes mental/physical 
limitations of the practitioners. 
Personnel factors Includes a variety of communication, coordination, and teamwork issues that 
impact performance 
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U
nsafe acts 
Human errors Decision errors: These “thinking” errors represent conscious, goal-intended 
behaviour that proceeds as designed, yet the plan proves inadequate or 
inappropriate for the situation. These errors typically manifest as poorly 
executed procedures, improper choices, or simply the misinterpretation and/or 
misuse of relevant information. 
Skill-based errors: Highly practiced behaviour that occurs with little or no 
conscious thought. These “doing” errors frequently appear as breakdown in 
visual scan patterns, forgotten intentions, and omitted items in checklists. 
Even the manner or technique with which one performs a task is included. 
Perceptual errors: Medication errors resulting from sound alike, look-alike 
drugs or the use of decimal point or abbreviations 
Violations Routine violations: Often referred to as “bending the rules,” this type of 
violation tends to be habitual by nature and is often enabled by a system of 
supervision and management that tolerates such departures from the rules. 
Exceptional violations: Isolated departures from authority, neither typical of 
the individual nor condoned by management 
 
 
 
